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ARTICLE
THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN THE VIRGINIA
CONSTITUTION AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRECEDENT IN
VIRGINIA AND THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Stephen P. Halbrookt
I. INTRODUCTION

The right to keep and bear arms in Virginia is guaranteed by both the
state and federal constitutions. Article I, section 13, of the Virginia
Constitution provides in part: "That a well regulated militia, composed of
the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe
defense of a free state, therefore, the right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed .. .. "' The first clause dates to 1776, while the

second clause was not adopted until 1971. The Second Amendment to the
United States Constitution was adopted in 1791 and provides: "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."2
The right to keep and bear arms has trod a rocky road in Virginia. While
antebellum statutes only restricted the carrying of concealed weapons, the
slave codes prohibited possession of firearms by African Americans. The
latter continued to be enforced at the beginning of Reconstruction, and a
pistol registration scheme adopted during the Jim Crow era had similar
aims. Formal recognition of the right by jurists went unquestioned from the
state's beginning through the adoption of the 1971 amendment, after which
a point came when a dissident view emerged that the only "right" was that

t J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; Ph.D., Philosophy, Florida State
University. Books include The Founders' Second Amendment; Freedmen, the Fourteenth
Amendment, & the Right to Bear Arms (reissued as Securing Civil Rights); Firearms Law
Deskbook; That Every Man Be Armed; and Gun Control in the Third Reich. Argued Printz v.
United States (1997) and other Supreme Court cases, and represented a majority of members
of Congress as amici curiae i District of Columbia v. Heller (2008). Former assistant
professor of philosophy at Tuskegee Institute, Howard University, and George Mason
University; Research Fellow, Independent Institute; in law practice since 1978 in Fairfax, Va.
See www.stephenhalbrook.com. Copyright @ 2014 Stephen P. Halbrook; LIBERTY UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW. All rights reserved.

1. VA. CONsT. art. I, § 13.
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. II.
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of a state's "collective" power to maintain the National Guard. That view
came to be rejected by the Virginia Supreme Court.
The federal courts paid little attention to the Second Amendment until
strong federal restrictions were adopted in the Gun Control Act of 1968.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit took the
"collective" power view that no individual right existed, until the United
States Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)3 that the
Amendment guarantees a fundamental, personal right to possess and carry
firearms. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit opined that the Second Amendment
does not apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, until that
view was overturned by the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Chicago, Ill.
(2010).' The Fourth Circuit since then has read these precedents very
narrowly.
This Article traces the above developments. It suggests that Virginia
courts have paid little attention to the right, likely because it has not been
the subject of stringent restrictions under state law. The Fourth Circuit has
not had occasion to opine much on the state laws within its jurisdiction
with the exception of those of Maryland, which are considerably more
restrictive than the laws of Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina. As analyzed below, the Fourth Circuit has deferentially
upheld federal restrictions together with Maryland's broad prohibitions,
which were ratcheted up in 2013. Thus far, the Fourth Circuit has
interpreted the Second Amendment narrowly.
II. THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN VIRGINIA

A. The Founding
The Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, authored by George Mason,
did not include a specific clause recognizing a right to bear arms, but that
right was implicit in the following:
That a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the
people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of
a free state; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be
avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military

3. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
4. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the
civil power.'
Thomas Jefferson drafted a bill of rights which explicitly stated: "No
freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms. ... Printing presses shall be
free . . . ."6 While that draft was not proposed to the convention, no one
questioned such rights during this period.
That was exemplified when the federal Constitution was proposed in
1787 without a bill of rights. In The Federalist No. 46, James Madison
contended that a potential federal tyranny "would be opposed [by] a militia
amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands."
Alluding to "the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess
over the people of almost every other nation," Madison continued:
"Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of
Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the
governments are afraid to trust the people with arms."'
In the Virginia convention that ratified the United States Constitution,
Patrick Henry argued that "the great object is, that every man be armed.""
George Mason warned against "disarm[ing] the people; that it was the best
and most effectual way to enslave them." A compromise was reached to
ratify the Constitution and recommend a bill of rights asserting "the
essential and unalienable rights of the people," 2 including: "That the people
have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed
of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe
defence of a free state

.... ""

The Bill of Rights would be ratified in 1791

with the familiar language of the Second Amendment.

5.

VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XIII (1776).

6.

1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 344 (Boyd ed., 1950).

7.

See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS' SECOND AMENDMENT 129-33 (2008).

8. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 90 (James Madison) (Hein ed., 1788).

9. Id. 90-91.
10.

3

J. ELLIOT,

DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 386 (1836).
11. Id. at 380.
12. Id. at 657.
13. Id. at 659. For a comprehensive analysis of the Virginia convention, see HALBROOK,
supra note 7, at 216-33.
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The Antebellum Period

Virginia jurist St. George Tucker, known as "The American Blackstone,"
wrote in the first commentaries on the United States Constitution in 1803
the following about the Second Amendment:
This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty .... The
right of self-defense is the first law of nature; in most
governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this right
within the narrowest limits possible. Whenever standing armies
are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bears arms is,
under any color or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not
already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction. In England,
the people have been disarmed, generally under the specious
pretext of preserving the game; a never-failing lure to bring over
the landed aristocracy to support any measure under that mask,
though calculated for very different purposes. True it is, their bill
of rights seems at first view to counteract this policy; but their
right of bearing arms is confined to protestants, and the words
"suitable to their condition or degree" have been interpreted to
authorize the prohibition of keeping a gun or other engine for
the destruction of game, by any farmer, or inferior tradesman, or
other person not qualified to kill game. So that not one man in
five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject
to a penalty.
Bearing arms was not only a right, it was a duty. Reflecting state laws, the
federal Militia Act of 1792 required every "free able bodied white male
citizen" aged 18 through 45 to "provide himself with a good musket or
firelock," bayonet, and ammunition.s As Jefferson would write, most state
constitutions provided "that all power is inherent in the people; ... that it is

their right and duty to be at all times armed; that they are entitled to
freedom of person, freedom of religion, freedom of property, and freedom
of the press.""

14. 1 WILuAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES Appendix 300 (St. George Tucker ed.,
1803). See also Stephen P. Halbrook, St. George Tucker's Second Amendment: Deconstructing
"The True Palladium of Liberty," 3 TENN. J.OF L. & POL'Y, No. 2, 120 (2007).
15. Chap. 33, 1 Statutes at Large of the United States 271-72.
16. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Major John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), in
WRITINGS, at 1491-92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
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By contrast, Virginia's 18th century slave codes provided that "[n]o
negro or mulatto shall keep or carry any gun, powder, shot, club, or other
weapon whatever" under penalty of 39 lashes, but "every free negro or
mulatto, being a housekeeper, may be permitted to keep one gun, powder
and shot," and a bond or free negro may "keep and use" a gun by license at
frontier plantations." These provisions remained in Virginia's 1819 Code,
which also provided: "No free negro or mulatto, shall be suffered to keep or
carry any fire-lock of any kind, any military weapon, or any powder or lead,
without first obtaining a license from the court of the county or corporation
in which he resides .... "
In 1838, Virginia enacted its first concealed-weapon restriction: "If a free
person, habitually, carry about his person hid from common observation,
any pistol, dirk, bowie knife, or weapon of the like kind, he shall be fined
fifty dollars. The informer shall have one half of such fine."" Law
enforcement officers were not exempt-the Virginia high court affirmed
the conviction of a constable who "drew out a pistol and dirk" against one
merely to levy an execution.2 0
C. From Reconstruction to the Jim Crow Era
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
intended and understood to protect fundamental Bill of Rights guarantees,
including the individual right to keep and bear arms.21 As in other Southern
States, during Reconstruction, Virginia officials enforced slave code
provisions prohibiting African Americans from carrying firearms without a
license. For instance, a witness before a Congressional committee that
would draft the Fourteenth Amendment testified that "attempts were made
in that city [Alexandria] to enforce the old law against them [blacks] in
respect to whipping and carrying fire-arms, nearly or quite up to the time of
the establishment of the Freedmen's Bureau in that city."" A U.S. military
17. Acts of 1748, 6 Hening, Statutes at Large 109-10; 1792, 1 Statutes at Large of
Virginia, 1792-1806, 123 (Samuel Shepherd ed., 1835).
18. 1 CODEOF VA. ch. 111, § 8 at 423 (1819).
19. CODE OF VA, tit. 54 ch. 196, § 7 (1849).
20. Hicks v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 597, 598 (1850).
21. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3038-42 (2010). See generally
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, SECURING CIVIL RIGHTS: FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (2010).

22. Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, H.R. REP. No. 30, pt. 2, at 21
(1866).
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officer who assisted the Freedmen's Bureau and protected the rights of freed
slaves testified that State officials "have entreated me to take the arms of the
blacks away from them," which he refused to do. 23 The Freedmen's Bureau
Act recognized the right "to have full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the
acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal,
including the constitutional right to bear arms. . . ."2
As from the founding, at the turn of the century the right to bear arms
continued to be interpreted as a fundamental right necessary for a free
society. John Randolph Tucker, who served as Attorney General of Virginia,
Representative to Congress, and president of the American Bar
Association,2 5 wrote of the Second Amendment: "This prohibition indicates
that the security of liberty against the tyrannical tendency of government is
only to be found in the right of the people to keep and bear arms in resisting
the wrongs of government."2 6
In a 1909 decision that came to be known as the "saddlebags defense,"
Virginia's high court ruled that a hunter who placed his revolver in latched
saddlebags was not carrying it "about his person" since it was not readily
accessible for immediate use." The editors at the Virginia Law Register were
unhappy with the decision and appealed to racism in support of restrictive
measures:
It is a matter of common knowledge that in this state and in
several others, the more especially in the Southern states where
the negro population is so large, that this cowardly practice of
"toting" guns has always been one of the most fruitful sources of
crime .... There would be a very decided falling off of killings

"in the heat of passion" if a prohibitive tax were laid on the
privilege of handling and disposing of revolvers and other small
arms, or else that every person purchasing such deadly weapons
should be required to register .... Let a negro board a railroad
23. Id. at 30.
24. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3040 (quoting FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AcT § 14, 14 STATUTES
AT LARGE 173, 176-77 (1866)).
25. BiographicalDirectoryof the UnitedStates Congress 1958 (1989).
26. 2 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 671 (1899).
27. Sutherland v. Commonwealth, 65 S.E. 15 (Va. 1909). The Record filed with the
Petition at page ten notes that the defendant had been chasing a squirrel through some brush
with his revolver. Sutherlandwas overruled by Schaaf v. Commonwealth, 258 S.E.2d 574 (Va.
1979).
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train with a quart of mean whiskey and a pistol in his grip and
the chances are that there will be a murder, or at least a row,
before he alights.28
Registration and an annual tax of one dollar per pistol or revolver were
enacted in 1926 in Virginia.29 The expense and paperwork, similar to the
poll tax for voting, would have made it difficult or impossible for the poor,
including African Americans, to obtain or possess handguns. Those found
in possession of unregistered handguns could be prosecuted and the
handguns confiscated. A person convicted of not paying the tax "shall be
fined not less than twenty-five nor more than fifty dollars, or sentenced to
the State convict road force for not less than thirty or not more than sixty
days, or both, in the discretion of the tribunal trying the case."'o
Since poor persons convicted of possession of an untaxed handgun could
not pay any such fine, they would likely have been sentenced to the convict
road force, about which it was written:
Here in Virginia, practically all of our common labor is
performed by negroes. Five-sixths of our criminals are negroes
and about three-fourths of the convict road force are negroes.
About the only difference between the free negro laborer of the
ordinary variety and the convict negro laborer is that the latter
got caught.31
Disregarding the racist innuendo, African Americans who would not or
could not register and pay the tax for exercise of the right to keep and bear
arms-if they would even have been allowed to do so-were subject to
being incarcerated and forced to work on roads for one to two months. The
scheme seems reminiscent of slavery or involuntary servitude. The law also
disarmed law-abiding African Americans who were the main victims of
crime in their community.
The Virginia handgun tax would be declared unconstitutional because it
imposed the same tax on all pistols regardless of value-"the pistol of little
value and the revolver of the rich studded with diamonds are liable to the

28. Editorial, CarryingConcealed Weapons, 15 VA. L. REG. 391-92 (1909).
29. 1926 VA. ACTs 285-87.

30. Id. at 286. The State convict road force was created by 1906 VA. ACTS 74.
31. ROBERT W. WITHERS, ROAD BUILDING BY CONVICTS, in PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION AT THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL
SESSION HELD IN RICHMOND, VA., MAY 6TH TO 13TH

1908,209 (Alexander Johnson ed., 1908).
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same direct tax of one dollar" 32-and was later repealed." The right to keep
and bear arms was not mentioned in the opinion.
The annual handgun tax of $1.00 had a ready precedent in Virginia's
annual poll tax of $1.50," payment of which was required to vote." As the
United States Supreme Court would hold: "The Virginia poll tax was born
of a desire to disenfranchise the Negro.""6 The sponsor of the poll tax
provision at the Virginia constitutional convention of 1902 explained:
Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we propose; that,
exactly, is what this Convention was elected for-to discriminate
to the very extremity of permissible action under the limitations
of the Federal Constitution, with a view to the elimination of
every negro voter who can be gotten rid of, legally, without
materially impairing the numerical strength of the white
electorate.37
It was not until ratification of the Twenty-fourth Amendment in 1964 that
Virginia's annual poll tax of $1.50 would be invalidated."
D. Adoption of the Arms Guarantee
The political assassinations and urban unrest of the 1960's led to the
proposal or enactment at the federal and state levels of numerous
prohibitions on the right to keep and bear arms. In 1964, the Virginia
General Assembly reacted to proposals for such enactments by passing a
resolution "[c]oncerning the inherent right of citizens of this
Commonwealth to own and bear arms," which stated:
Whereas, the right of the citizen is entwined in the very
roots of the founding of this Commonwealth when it was not
only the individual's right to bear arms but his duty to bear arms
in the defense of his community-only slaves were forbidden by
law to carry weapons-Thomas Jefferson deemed the right to
32. Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 13 Va. L. Reg., N.S. 746 (Hustings Ct.-Roanoke 1928)).
33. 1936 VA. AcTs 486.
34. Bowen v. Commonwealth, 101 S.E. 232, 233 (1919).
35. Smith v. Bell, 75 S.E. 125, 125 (1912) (citing VA. CONST. art. II, § 21).
36. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 543 (1965).
37. Id. (quoting Statement of Carter Glass, in 2 VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
(Proceedings & Debates, 1901-1902) at 3076-77).
38. Id. at 530-31.
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bear arms worthy of inclusion in his drafts of the Virginia
Constitution-and the rise or fall of the political rights of the
citizen has been allied with right to bear arms or the deprivation
of such rights; ...
Resolved ... , That the right to keep and bear arms

guaranteed by the second amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and which right is an inalienable part of our
citizens' heritage in this State shall not be infringed; that any
action taken by the General Assembly of Virginia to interfere
with this right would strike at the basic liberty of our citizens;
that no agency of this State or of any political subdivision should
be given any power or seek any power which would prohibit the
purchase or possession of firearms by any citizen of good
standing for the purpose of personal defense, sport, recreation or
other noncriminal activities; and that registration of arms, for
which registration is not presently required, not be required, by
legislative action of this body . ....

In 1969, the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Revision solicited
public views but rejected a proposal from George S. Knight of Alexandria,
Virginia, "for a constitutional guarantee of the right to bear arms.""
However, in 1969-1970, the Virginia General Assembly debated and
proposed such an amendment. Recalling the above 1964 resolution, Senator
George F. Barnes began by noting that "I dare say that not a person on this
39. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE (VA.) 250-51, 472 (1964).
40.

THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL

REVISION 98, 507 (1969). George S. Knight explained in an affidavit dated Oct. 2, 1986, in the
author's possession, as follows:
As commonly understood in the 1969-1970 period by members of the
general public in Virginia, "the right of the people to keep and bear arms"
expresses a personal right of private individuals to keep firearms (including
rifles, shotguns, pistols, and revolvers) and other commonly possessed arms in
their homes, businesses, and other premises, and to bear or carry arms for
lawful purposes, including defense of self, family, and the Commonwealth.
The right-to-bear-arms guarantee was supported by and adopted to protect
the interests of sportsmen, hunters, and lawabiding persons in general from
infringement of said right, "infringement" meaning registration of firearms,
waiting periods to purchase firearms, any general prohibition on possession of
firearms by lawabiding persons, and failure to issue permits to lawabiding
persons to carry firearms not open to common observation for personal
protection.
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floor at the time we opened this session realized that these words were not
in our state Constitution."' Senator M. M. Long explained that the proposal
would protect "the sportsmen of this State," that the right "is guaranteed to
the citizens by the second amendment," and that "some citizens feel that
they should be permitted to have arms in their homes ... ."42 The only

dissenter was Senator Harry E. Howell, Jr., who thought that the militia
should be confined to the National Guard and that constitutional protection
of the right of the people to keep and bear arms should not be recognized.4 3
The arms guarantee was part of a general revision of the Virginia
Constitution, which was laid before the voters as Proposal No. 1. At the
November 1970 elections, it passed by a vote of 576, 776 to 226, 219 and
became effective in 1971."
E. Commentariesand Attorney General Opinions
Virginia's arms guarantee lay dormant in the courts for the next forty
years. Professor A.E. Dick Howard opined that it "guarantees the right of all
citizens to serve in the armed militia of the Commonwealth and to bear
arms in defense of their way of life," and that "it no more embodies an
individual right to use or own weapons than does the Second
Amendment."" He quoted debates in the General Assembly in which
members opined that the Virginia guarantee would protect the same rights
as the Second Amendment but disregarded that the same members had in
mind an individual right for both. Further, no supporter said anything
about a "right" to serve in the militia. Militia service is a duty imposed by
law, and no person has a constitutional "right" actually "to serve" in the
militia.
In a 1993 opinion, Attorney General Mary Sue Terry repeated Prof.
Howard's interpretation, concluding:
The "right to bear arms" phrase of Article I, § 13 of the
Constitution of Virginia is synonymous with the Second
41. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION, EXTRA SESSION 1969/1970, 391 (1970).
42. Id. at 393.
43. Id. at 393-94.

44. Constitutionof Viginia, Effective July 1, 1971, with Amendments - January1, 2103, at
Forward III & n.4 (2013), available at http://constitution.legis.virginia.gov/Constitution-0113.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
45. 1 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 266, 277
(1974).
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Amendment to the United States Constitution. Under longstanding federal case law, the Second Amendment confers only a
collective right to bear arms. It is thus my opinion that legislation
allowing a person to purchase no more than one handgun in a
thirty-day period would not violate either the Second
Amendment or Article I, § 13.4
A prohibition on purchasing more than one handgun in thirty days
passed, although it was later repealed. Since it is now settled that both the
Second Amendment and Article I, § 13, protect an individual right, not a
"collective right," query whether the prohibition was constitutional.4 8 Such a
provision would never be countenanced regarding rights under other
constitutional guarantees, such as the First Amendment. Imagine a law
prohibiting the purchase of more than one book per month.
All subsequent Attorney General opinions interpreted the Virginia
guarantee and the Second Amendment to protect individual rights. In 2006,
Attorney General Judith W. Jagdmann opined that, while firearms may be
restricted on a university campus, rights under these two guarantees "may
not be summarily dismissed for transient reasons," and "[t]he universal
prohibition of firearms by properly permitted persons other than students,
faculty, administration, or employees,. . .is not allowed under law."49
Attorney General opinions thereafter have had the benefit of the 2008
United States Supreme Court ruling in District of Columbia v. Heller that
the Second Amendment guarantees individual rights,so and in its 2010
ruling in McDonald v. Chicago, Ill. that the Second Amendment applies to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." In 2010, Attorney General
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II opined that the right is not unlimited and that the
Constitution restrains the government and not private actors, and thus "a
private entity leasing government property for an event generally may

46. Opinion from Att'y Gen. Mary Sue Terry to Hon. S. Vance Wilkins, Jr., 1993 Va.
Op. Att'y. Gen. 13, 1993 WL 355654, *3.
47. VA. CODE § 18.2-308.2:2(P), repealed by Acts 2012, cc. 37, 257.
48. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624, 627 (2008).
49. Opinion from Att'y Gen. Judith W. Jagdmann to Hon. R. Creigh Deeds (No. 05078), 2006 WL 304006, *2.
50. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624, 627.
51. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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regulate or prohibit the carrying or possession of firearms on that property
for such event.""
And in 2011, Cuccinelli opined regarding the prohibition on carrying a
weapon to a place of worship "without good and sufficient reason," thatgiven the constitutional right to bear arms for self-defense-"carrying a
weapon for personal protection constitutes a good and sufficient reason
under the statute ...

."

However, "the church can ban guns on its property

if it so chooses," because the guarantee restrains government, not private
parties who have property rights."
In DiGiacinto, the Supreme Court of Virginia observed that, in Heller
and McDonald, the United States Supreme Court held "that the right to
carry a firearm is not unlimited,"" and indeed Heller specifically stated that
"nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on . . . laws

forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings .... " It is noteworthy that such exceptions confirm
the rule that there is indeed, in the above words of DiGiacinto, a "right to
carry a firearm." But "[t]he fact that GMU [George Mason University] is a
school and that its buildings are owned by the government indicates that
GMU is a 'sensitive place.""'
Following the established premise that regulation of fundamental
constitutional rights must be narrowly tailored, DiGiacinto further
explained:
The regulation does not impose a total ban of weapons on
campus. Rather, the regulation is tailored, restricting weapons
only in those places where people congregate and are most
vulnerable-inside campus buildings and at campus events.
Individuals may still carry or possess weapons on the open
grounds of GMU, and in other places on campus not
enumerated in the regulation. We hold that GMU is a sensitive
52. Opinion of Att'y Gen. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II to Hon. Thomas A. "Tag" Greason
(No. 10-009), 2010 WL 1129930.
53. Opinion of Att'y Gen. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II to Hon. Mark L. Cole (No. 11-043),
2011 WL 4429173, *1.
54. Id.
55. DiGiacinto v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason University, 704 S.E.2d 365, 369
(2011).
56. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)); accord
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047.
57. DiGiacinto, 704 S.E.2d at 370.
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place and that [the regulation] is constitutional and does not
violate Article I, § 13 of the Constitution of Virginia or the
Second Amendment of the federal Constitution."
DiGiacinto has been applied in two Attorney General opinions. In
contrast to the regulation at GMU prohibiting firearms at specified
locations, the University of Virginia (UVA) had a policy of forbidding
firearms on its entire grounds. Attorney General Cuccinelli opined that
UVA's policy may be applied against a person openly carrying a firearm,
but it may not be applied against a person with a concealed weapon permit,
which authorizes the carrying of a handgun state-wide unless "otherwise
prohibited by law."" Unlike a regulation, a policy fails to have the status of
something "prohibited by law," and moreover the UVA policy was broader
than the regulation in DiGiacinto:
For example, the [UVA] Medical Center policy includes within
the ban a "controlled outdoor area" and both policies include
virtually all University buildings and property. The Court in
DiGiacinto noted as a consideration in favor of the
constitutionality of George Mason University's regulation the
fact that the regulation was "tailored" and allowed individuals to
"carry or possess weapons on the open grounds of GMU, and in
other places on campus not enumerated in the regulation." Bans
that are broader than the one expressly approved by the Supreme
Court of Virginia in DiGiacinto, while likely facially
constitutional, are vulnerable to "as applied" challenges with
respect to particular places.o
The above opined on the legality, not the wisdom, of restricting firearm
possession on campus, but the opinion remarked: "It certainly can be
argued that such policies are ineffectual because persons who wish to
perpetrate violence will ignore them, and that the net effect of such policies
is to leave defenseless the law-abiding citizens who follow these policies."61
That, of course, was the bitter lesson of the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre.
DiGiacintowas also applied in an opinion agreeing with the validity of a
Hanover County ordinance prohibiting discharge of a firearm in or along a
58. Id.
59. Opinion of Att'y Gen. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II to Hon. Emmett W. Hanger, Jr. (No.
11-078), 2011 WL 4429187, *4 (citing VA. CODE § 18.2-308(0)).
60. Id. at *3.
61. Id. at *4.
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public road or within 100 yards thereof, or within 100 yards of a building
occupied or used as a dwelling or place where the public gathers, with
exceptions for one's own dwelling or "in the lawful defense of his own
person or property or that of a member of his family." 62 Attorney General
Cuccinelli reasoned that the ordinance does not violate the right to bear
arms because:
First, it specifically exempts from its scope actions taken in
defense of self, others or property. Therefore, it does not
implicate one of the core concerns of the right to bear arms.
Second, it does not preclude anyone from carrying a firearm.
Instead, it simply prohibits certain uses of a firearm. Moreover,
the ordinance serves a proper purpose, to protect the public
safety, by prohibiting firearm discharges on roads or near
occupied buildings.
While the right to bear arms has not been the subject of a further holding
by the Virginia Supreme Court, that right was mentioned in a case
regarding when a circuit court evaluates whether a person meets the
requirements for involuntary commitment to a mental institution.64 The
answer is the date of the de novo hearing in the circuit court, not the date of
admission or the date of the lower court's hearing. 5 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Mims observed that the case was not moot based on the
collateral consequences for which relief was sought, which were "real, and
potentially of constitutional magnitude."66 Those collateral consequences
specifically involved the prohibition on possession of a firearm by a person
involuntarily admitted.6 ' Noting that "the General Assembly shows great
respect for the constitutional right to keep and bear arms,"" he concluded
that part of the opinion: "Due process requires that there be an avenue for
constitutionally cognizable collateral consequences to be addressed."69

62. Opinion of Att'y Gen. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II to Hon. Christopher K. Peace (No.
11-065), 2011 WL 2583851, *2.
63. Id. at *3.
64. Paugh v. Henrico Area Mental Health & Developmental Servs., 743 S.E.2d 277
(2013).
65. Id. at 278.

66. Id. at 280 (Mims, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 281 n.2 (citing VA. CODE § 18.2-308.1:3(A)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 281.
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As noted, the Virginia arms guarantee has been interpreted consistent
with the federal Second Amendment as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald. The following discusses the status
of the Second Amendment in the rulings of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which includes Virginia within its
jurisdiction.
III. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT:
FROM A "COLLECTIVE RIGHT" TO NO RIGHT TO "BEAR ARMS"?
A. The Pre-Heller/McDonald Fourth Circuit
Back in the 1980's, a young man and his girlfriend were driving in
Alexandria, Virginia and stopped at a federal enclave along the Potomac
River for a stroll.70 In compliance with Virginia law, the man carried a
revolver in plain sight in the truck. A federal park police officer came by,
noticed the revolver, and left the immediate area to call backup. The couple
returned to the truck and drove away at a normal speed, leaving the federal
property.
The officer pursued the truck, turned on his flashing lights, and stopped
the couple. Suddenly, two Fairfax County police cars arrived. The man and
woman were pulled from the truck, thrown down on their stomachs, and
handcuffed behind their backs. Officers pointed pistols and shotguns at
their heads. The man was charged with possession of a firearm on park
property.
I represented the man in United States District Court in Alexandria.
Judge Albert Bryan denied my motion to dismiss under the Second
Amendment as "frivolous," a not unexpected decision given Fourth Circuit
precedent. In a 1973 decision, the Fourth Circuit had written off the Second
Amendment in one sentence: "The courts have consistently held that the
Second Amendment only confers a collective right of keeping and bearing
arms which must bear a 'reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia.""' The court cited the 1939 Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Miller, but Miller made no reference to a
"collective" right, and-the Supreme Court wrote in Heller-"positively
70. Portions of sections III.A and III.C are adapted from Stephen P. Halbrook, No Right
to 'BearArms? A CriticalAnalysis of United States v. Masciandaro, 1 WAKE FOREsT L. REv.
ONLINE 94 (2011).

71. United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974) (quoting United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
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suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep
and bear arms (though only arms that 'have some reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia')."n But in my case,
the Fourth Amendment was alive and well-Judge Bryan ruled the arrest
and seizure to be illegal because the officer was outside his jurisdiction
when he arrested the defendant (who was not fleeing) and seized the
defendant's firearm.
The above "collective right" theory was repeated in a 1995 Fourth Circuit
opinion upholding denial of a permit to carry a handgun under Maryland
law." Noting that the applicant argued "that she has an individual federal
constitutional right to 'keep and bear' a handgun, and Maryland may not
infringe upon this right," the court responded: "She is wrong on both
counts. The Second Amendment does not apply to the states." . . .
Moreover, even as against federal regulation, the amendment does not
confer an absolute individual right to bear any type of firearm."" Finding
that the applicant had "not identified how her possession of a handgun will
preserve or insure the effectiveness of the militia," the court upheld the
denial."
B. Heller and McDonald
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second
Amendment "right of the people to keep and bear arms" really does refer to
the actual people and really does recognize their right to possess and carry
firearms for self defense, militia use, and hunting." That was followed by
McDonald v. Chicago, Ill., which extended the right through the Fourteenth
Amendment to states and localities.78 But since the specific laws that Heller
and McDonald invalidated were bans on possession of handguns even in the
72. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008).
73. Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120 (1995).
74. Id. at 123. The court cited two inapposite precedents for that proposition. United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876), only held that the Second Amendment does
not protect persons from "violation by their fellow-citizens"-no state action was involved.
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886), held that the Second Amendment does not apply
directly to the states but did not consider whether it so applies through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
75. Love, 47 F.3d at 123-24.
76. Id. at 124.
77. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599.
78. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3051 (2010).
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home, some lower courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have been reluctant
to recognize the Amendment's protection of the right to "bear arms," which
the text does not limit to the home.
C. Masciandaro
79
The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Masciandaro
exemplifies this reluctance. While the panel was divided on whether a right
to bear arms outside the home exists, it was unanimous in upholding the
conviction of a man for possessing a loaded firearm in one of the same
federal enclaves along the Potomac River as in my case in the 1980's.8o The
ddja vu facts were just as innocuous: a man and his girlfriend were dozing in
his automobile at a recreational area known as Daingerfield Island; a park
police officer noticed that the vehicle was not parked exactly right by the
painted lines, asked if any weapons were in the vehicle, was freely told yes,
and arrested the man for possession of a loaded firearm."
The decision does not reflect that, as in my case, the officer manhandled
the couple and pointed his pistol at their heads for the "crime" of exercising
Second Amendment rights. Indeed, by the time the case got to trial, the law
had changed to allow carrying loaded firearms in compliance with state
law.82 One wonders what the prosecutor was thinking, other than the
proverbial "batting average," when not dismissing the charge for lack of
prosecutorial merit.
In Masciandaro,Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion for the court except
for the critical Part III.B, which Judge Wilkinson authored and Senior Judge
Duffy joined.83 Judge Wilkinson said that, if the Supreme Court wanted the
right to bear arms outside the home to be recognized, it would have to say
so more explicitly." Judge Neimeyer said that the right to bear arms exists,
but the ban on possession of a loaded firearm was consistent with the
Second Amendment, applying an intermediate level of scrutiny."

79. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
756 (2011).
80. See supra part III.A.
81. Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 460.
82. Id. at 461.
83. Id. at 467, 474.
84. Id. at 475.
85. Id. at 473-74.
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D. A Right to Possess a Loaded Handgun Outside the Home for SelfDefense?
In his version of Part III.B, Judge Niemeyer would have held that "there
is a plausible reading of Heller that the Second Amendment provides such a
right" to "possess a loaded handgun for self-defense outside the home. "86
Indeed, there is more than a plausible reading of the Second Amendment
itself to that effect, in that it provides that "the right of the people to . . . bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."" When a provision of the Bill of Rights
relates to a house, it says so." Nothing in the Amendment's text limits
bearing arms to one's house, a place where the right to "keep" arms fits
more appropriately.
This plain textual reference prohibiting infringement on the right to
"bear arms" should be respected given that "general statements of the law
are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning .... "" This is
because "broad constitutional requirements [may be] 'made specific' by the
text or settled interpretations," not just by the latter."0 To disregard explicit
constitutional text based on supposedly insufficient judicial precedent
ignores the primacy of the Constitution and the fundamental rights it
protects.91
As Judge Niemeyer wrote, Heller explicitly stated that bearing arms
outside the home could take place for self-defense, militia activity, and
hunting, which are not "home-bound" activities.92 Heller's statement that
the need for self defense is "most acute" in the home suggests that it may
86. Id. at 467.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. II.

88. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law."); U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated....").
89. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997).
90. Id. at 267 (citation omitted). As stated in the Fourth Amendment context: "Given
that the particularity requirement is set forth in the text of the Constitution, no reasonable
officer could believe that a warrant that plainly did not comply with that requirement was
valid." Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004).
91. "This constitutional protection must not be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly
spirit." Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956). "To view a particular provision of
the Bill of Rights with disfavor inevitably results in a constricted application of it. This is to
disrespect the Constitution." Id. at 428-29.
92. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011).
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also be needed outside the home, albeit perhaps less acutely. 3 The
"presumptive validity" of "laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings" assumes a right to
carry firearms in non-sensitive places." As Judge Niemeyer observed:
What the Heller Court describes as the general preexisting right
to keep and bear arms for participation in militias, for selfdefense, and for hunting is thus not strictly limited to the home
environment but extends in some form to wherever those
activities or needs occur, just as other Amendments apply
generally to protect other individual freedoms."
E. Strict or Intermediate Scrutiny?
In the next part of the opinion, joined by the full court, Judge Niemeyer
proceeded to consider the government interest in the restriction under the
appropriate level of scrutiny. The Fourth Circuit had applied intermediate
scrutiny to the prohibition on possession of a firearm by a person convicted
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." That prohibition on
exercise of Second Amendment rights by a misdemeamt was itself
unprecedented-before its passage only felons were denied such rights.
The court "assume[d] that any law that would burden the 'fundamental,'
core right of self-defense in the home by a law-abiding citizen would be
subject to strict scrutiny."" Limiting the core right to the home, as noted,
disregards that the Amendment's text refers not just to keeping, but also
bearing arms, and does not mention the home. Carrying concealed
handguns had become regulated in the nineteenth century, but the decision
in that period that supposedly "appl[ied] review of a decidedly less-thanstrict nature"9 8 actually found the right to carry arms to be broad indeed:
"The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and
not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description, and not such

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 469 (citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 677 (4th Cir. 2010)).
Id. at 470.
Id.
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merely as are used by the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken
in upon, in the smallest degree. . . .""
The court announced a policy-driven level of scrutiny because: "Were we
to require strict scrutiny in circumstances such as those presented here, we
would likely foreclose an extraordinary number of regulatory measures,
thus handcuffing lawmakers' ability to 'prevent[ ] armed mayhem' in public
places ... "100 This failed to distinguish the law-abiding populace (the

defendant here had a Virginia concealed weapons permit, albeit expired)
from those who would actually commit mayhem. Still, the court found "the
application of strict scrutiny important to protect the core right of the selfdefense of a law-abiding citizen in his home," but then "conclude[d] that a
lesser showing is necessary with respect to laws that burden the right to
keep and bear arms outside of the home."1o' Thus, the prohibition would be
upheld if it passed intermediate scrutiny, i.e., "is reasonably adapted to a
substantial governmental interest."'02
Intermediate scrutiny, however, is Justice Breyer's "judge-empowering
'interest-balancing inquiry' that 'asks whether the statute burdens a
protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the
statute's salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.""o
Heller rejected that test: "We know of no other enumerated constitutional
right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding 'interestbalancing' approach."'r
The place in question-a parking lot-could hardly be classified as
"sensitive," so the Masciandaro court saw no need to conduct that
analysis.'0 o Intermediate scrutiny would, as it often does, ensure the
government's victory. Naturally, "the government has a substantial interest
in providing for the safety of individuals who visit and make use of the
national parks .... "io Also naturally, the prohibition "is reasonably adapted
99. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 249 (1846). This quotation was relied on in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 612 (2008).
100. Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 471.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. Justice Breyer cited intermediate scrutiny cases as embodying
his proposed "interest balancing" test. Id. at 690 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195-96 (1997); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
428, 433 (1992)).
104. Id. at 634.
105. Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 473.
106. Id.

2014]

THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS

639

to that substantial governmental interest."' That was because loaded
firearms are more dangerous than unloaded ones, "as they could fire
accidentally or be fired before a potential victim has the opportunity to
flee."'" Ignoring that no record of accidents existed here, that latter
comment would give incentive to law-abiding persons to carry arms for
self-defense to keep from being victims.
The hypothetical character of these dangers in this interest-balancing
analysis ignored that the department's regulation had been repealed and
Congress, with President Obama's signature, had changed the law to allow
the previously prohibited conduct.' In short, the government itself (other
than the prosecutor and the court) had concluded that carrying a loaded
firearm consistent with state law was not a public danger.
To be sure, unloaded firearms could be carried, and although "the need
to load a firearm impinges on the need for armed self-defense," that is okay
under intermediate scrutiny."o But the Second Amendment states that "the
right of the people to ... bear Arms, shall not be infringed." That is a
categorical command requiring some exception more than a general
reference to public safety.
F. No Second Amendment ProtectionOutside the Home?
Judge Wilkinson,"' joined by Judge Duffy, wrote the majority's version
of Part III.B of the opinion, holding that "it is unnecessary to explore in this
case the question of whether and to what extent the Second Amendment
right recognized in Heller applies outside the home."" 2 The court explained:
On the question of Heller's applicability outside the home
environment, we think it prudent to await direction from the
Court itself. See Williams v. State, [10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(h), 16 U.S.C. § la-7b(b).
110. Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 474.
111. Judge Wilkinson previously wrote a lengthy article arguing that Heller was wrongly
decided, commenting: "Roe [v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)] and Heller share a significant
flaw: both cases found judicially enforceable substantive rights only ambiguously rooted in
the Constitution's text." J.Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the UnravelingRule
of Law, 95 VA. L, REv. 253, 257 (2009). But see generally, Nelson Lund & David B. Kopel,
Unraveling Judicial Restraint: Guns, Abortion, and the Faux Conservatism of J. Harvie
Wilkinson, 111, 25 J.L. &POL. 1 (2009).
112. Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 474.
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2011)] ("If the Supreme Court, in [McDonald's] dicta, meant its
holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need to say so
more plainly.")."'
Yet McDonald could not have been plainer when it stated "our central
holding in Heller: that the Second Amendment protects a personal right to
keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense
within the home.""' As regarding the First Amendment, speech that is
most-notably protected does not imply that other speech enjoys no
protection."s
Masciandaro added that "[tihere may or may not be a Second
Amendment right in some places beyond the home, but we have no idea
what those places are" 6-perhaps non-sensitive places? While resolution
of such issues would be helpful to the Supreme Court in deciding cases, the
Fourth Circuit decided "to await that guidance from the nation's highest
court."" The policy-driven reason: "We do not wish to be even minutely
responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in the
peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to Second Amendment
rights."" But that was the very approach rejected by Heller:
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose
core protection has been subjected to a freestanding "interestbalancing" approach. The very enumeration of the right takes
out of the hands of government-even the Third Branch of
Government-the power to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the right is really worth insisting upon.'19
Moreover, disagreeing with the policy of the Second Amendment "and
thus not enforcing it" disarms potential victims and ignores that criminals
do not recognize laws imposing "gun-free zones," or indeed laws against

113. Id. at 475. This author filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in Williams case cited
by the Maciandarocourt. Charles F. Williams v. Maryland,No. 10-1207, 2011 WL 1296148
(Apr. 5, 2011). The petition was denied. 132 S. Ct. 93 (2011).
114. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020,3044 (2010).
115. "[S]peech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values and is entitled to special protection." Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207,
1211 (2011) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 475.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008).
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murder. An "unspeakably tragic act of mayhem" occurred at Daingerfield
Island in 2005 when a robber strangled a bicyclist to death and assaulted
other bicyclists in nearby locations.120 While not everyone would exercise
the right to bear arms and doing so is no guaranteed panacea against attack,
armed self-defense can be and is successful in many cases.
G. Recognition of the Right to Bear Arms in HistoricalContext
The state courts were well aware of the meaning of the right to "bear
arms" long before the Supreme Court decided Heller and McDonald. Just to
cite a decision rendered in a state in the Fourth Circuit, the North Carolina
Supreme Court in 1921 invalidated a ban on carrying handguns outside the
home because it is "the ordinary private citizen, whose right to carry arms
cannot be infringed upon," and further:
To him the rifle, the musket, the shotgun, and the pistol are
about the only arms which he could be expected to "bear," and
his right to do this is that which is guaranteed by the
Constitution. To deprive him of bearing any of these arms is to
infringe upon the right guaranteed to him by the Constitution.121
Both Heller and McDonald provided a detailed guidebook regarding the
text of the Second Amendment, its original understanding, the protection
of Second Amendment rights through the Fourteenth Amendment, and
general guidance that the lower federal courts could utilize to develop a
jurisprudence of Second Amendment rights as a applied to laws not
specifically at issue in those precedents. To the extent that the majority in
Masciandaroeschewed ruling on-indeed, even recognizing-the right to
"bear arms" pending further explicit guidance from the Supreme Court, the
Fourth Circuit missed an opportunity to contribute to this jurisprudence.
H. No "Lawful FirearmException" to the FourthAmendment
Despite its seeming timidity on recognizing Second Amendment rights,
the Fourth Circuit has not hesitated to resist watering down Fourth
Amendment rights where lawful firearms are concerned. It did so in the
context of a no-knock search case and in an open carry case.

120. The United States Park Police Advises a Homicide on DaingerfieldIsland,available at
http://www.nps.gov/uspp/528homdanis&arr.htm (visited June 5, 2011).
121. State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222,224 (N.C. 1921).
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While he did "not wish to be even minutely responsible for some
unspeakably tragic act of mayhem" in recognizing the right to bear armsl22
Judge Wilkinson took a more real-world approach in his opinion in Bellotte
2
v. Edwards.1
That decision upheld a civil rights action and rejected police
officers' claim of qualified immunity for executing a late-night, no-knock
entry into a family's home.124 No indication existed that the occupants "had
any tendency to violence in general.... To the contrary, the officers admit
that holding concealed carry permits showed the Bellottes to be citizens in
good standing who passed a background check."'25 The court continued: "It
should go without saying that carrying a concealed weapon pursuant to a
valid concealed carry permit is a lawful act. The officers admitted at oral
argument, moreover, that 'most people in West Virginia have guns. '126
Since its founding, Virginia has not restricted the open carrying of
firearms other than in limited circumstances and places. However, as this
author knows from representing defendants in such cases, it has not been
unusual for police to stop and detain, and sometimes to arrest for disorderly
conduct, persons doing so. United States v. Black,'27 an opinion by Judge
Gregory, held that openly carrying a handgun in a state (North Carolina)
where lawful to do so cannot give rise to a Terry stop.'28 Speculation that the
person might be a felon did not suffice:
Being a felon in possession of a firearm is not the default status.
More importantly, where a state permits individuals to openly
carry firearms, the exercise of this right, without more, cannot
justify an investigatory detention. Permitting such a justification
would eviscerate Fourth Amendment protections for lawfully
armed individuals in those states. 2 9
Nor did presence in a high crime area at night suffice, which would
imply "that Fourth Amendment protections are reserved only for a certain
race or class of people."'30 The court also rejected the "Rule of Two" under
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 475.
Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 418.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 423.
United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 540; see generally Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Black, 707 F.3d at 540.
Id. at 542.
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which the presence of one armed person justifies a Terry search of other
persons who are nearby:
Such a rule subjects to seizure or search anyone who actively or
passively associates with a gun carrier.. .. The absurdity of this
rule may be gleaned from scenarios where an individual carrying
a firearm walks into a monastery subjecting to seizure all of the
nuns and priests, or an ice-cream shop subjecting all of the
patrons to a seizure. Or could police officers apply this rule to
seize all individuals at a shooting range or on a hunting trip?"'
I. MarylandMay Prohibitthe BearingofArms
Unlike Virginia and the other states within the Fourth Circuit, Maryland
has no state guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms. As of 1860,
Maryland law provided that "[n]o slave shall carry any gun" without a
license from his master,'32 and "[n]o free negro shall be suffered to keep or
carry a firelock of any kind, any military weapon, or any powder or lead,"
without a license.'33 These slave code provisions were repealed in 1865 after
slavery was abolished. 4
At the Maryland constitutional convention of 1867, it was proposed that
"every citizen has the right to bear arms in defence of himself and the
State."' After a delegate moved that it should be restricted to "every white
citizen," delegate Isaac Jones stated: "Every citizen of the State means every
white citizen, and none other."' 6 Referring to the Second Amendment,
Jones added that "[w]e did not want any such declaration in the State of
Maryland."' 37 Jones had called emancipation of slaves "a violent, ruthless,
outrageous act,"'38 and persuaded the convention to make a demand for
compensation to ex-slave owners a part of the Maryland Constitution.'3 9

131. Id. at 541.
132. MD. CODE art. 66, § 22 at 454 (1860).
133. Id. at 464.
134. 3 SUPPLEMENT TO THE CODE OF MARYLAND 52 (1865).
135. PERLMAN, DEBATES OF THE MARYLAND CONVENTION OF 1867 79, 151 (1867).
136. Id. at 150-51.
137. Id. at 151.
138. BALTIMORE GAZETTE, May 29, 1867, at 4, col. 3.
139. MD. CONST. art. III, § 37 (1867). On Jones' authorship of the "emancipation
compensation" amendment, see MARYLAND JOURNAL (Towson), May 30, 1867, at 2, col. 1;
THE SUN (Baltimore), May 30, 1867, at 1, col. 2. Similarly, delegate George Brown, who
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After rejection even of a proposal that "the citizen shall not be deprived of
the right to keep arms on his premises," the original arms proposal was
rejected.140 It seems apparent that the slaveocracy remained in power in
Maryland, and it was not about to recognize a right to keep and bear arms
by blacks. Maryland remains one of the few states without an arms
guarantee today.
Currently, Maryland makes it a felony to carry a handgun and limits the
issuance of permits to carry a handgun to persons who convince the state
police that they have a "good and substantial reason" to do so. A federal
district court invalidated this law as violative of the Second Amendment
right to bear arms. In an opinion by Judge King, Woollard v. Gallagher"'
reversed, rejecting what it called the district court's "trailblazing
pronouncement that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms
for the purpose of self-defense extends outside the home, as well as its
determination that such right is impermissibly burdened by Maryland's
good-and-substantial-reason requirement." 4 1
Since the citizens at large are not deemed by the State Police as having
any need to bear arms, few permits are issued. To justify this policy,
Woollard noted that Maryland had the "eighth highest violent crime rate,"
"the third highest homicide rate," and "the second highest robbery rate of
any state in 2009."l' Those applying for and denied permits, needless to
say, saw this as reason enough. The court disagreed, holding: "The State has
clearly demonstrated that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement
advances the objectives of protecting public safety and preventing crime
because it reduces the number of handguns carried in public."1 4 4 The court
rejected arguments distinguishing the types of persons who would carry
handguns as permit holders and those who would do so for criminal

condemned the abolition of slavery as "a great wrong," BALTIMORE GAZETTE, May 29, 1867,
at 4, col. 3, opposed the arms guarantee because "he did not see how you could disarm any
man, drunk or sober, as he could throw himself on his reserved rights." PERLMAN, supra note
137, at 151.
140. PERLMAN,supra note 137, at 151.
141. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 867 (4th Cir. 2013), rev'g 863 F. Supp. 2d 462
(D. Md. 2012).
142. Id. Certiorari was denied. 2013 WL 3479421 (2013). The Fourth Circuit followed a
Second Circuit decision upholding New York's discretionary licensing scheme. See
Kachalsky v. Cnty of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).
143. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 877.
144. Id. at 879.
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purposes, and that reducing the number of persons who exercise a
constitutional right is impermissible. 4 1
Thus, while the "Second Amendment right is burdened by the good-andsubstantial-reason

requirement,

...

such burden

is constitutionally

permissible. That is, under the applicable intermediate scrutiny standard,
the State has demonstrated that the good-and-substantial-reason
requirement is reasonably adapted to Maryland's significant interests in
protecting public safety and preventing crime."'" One might suggest that
this would reword the Second Amendment to say that "the right of the
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed, if government officials
deem any of them as having a good and substantial reason for doing so."

J. Circuit Split?
Until recently, Illinois was the only state in the United States that made
no provision, not even a discretionary licensing scheme, to carry firearms
off of one's premises. The prohibition was invalidated by the Seventh
Circuit in Moore v. Madigan (2012)."' Reviewing text, history, and
precedent, the court concluded: "To speak of 'bearing' arms within one's
home would at all times have been an awkward usage. A right to bear arms
thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home." 48
The above inexorably stems from the fundamental right of self-defense,
about which the court wrote:
[A] Chicagoan is a good deal more likely to be attacked on a
sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than in his apartment on the
35th floor of the Park Tower. A woman who is being stalked or
has obtained a protective order against a violent ex-husband is
more vulnerable to being attacked while walking to or from her
home than when inside. She has a stronger self-defense claim to
be allowed to carry a gun in public than the resident of a fancy
apartment building (complete with doorman) has a claim to
sleep with a loaded gun under her mattress. 4 1

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 879-80.
Id. at 882.
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 936.
Id. at 937.
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Finally, in response to arguments that allowing the bearing of arms will
increase crime, Moore responded that "the Supreme Court made clear in
Heller that it wasn't going to make the right to bear arms depend on
casualty counts. If the mere possibility that allowing guns to be carried in
public would increase the crime or death rates sufficed to justify a ban,
Heller would have been decided the other way, for that possibility was as
great in the District of Columbia as it is in Illinois."'s As required by that
decision, Illinois has passed legislation providing for shall-issue carry
licenses."s'
IV. CONCLUSION

It is yet to be seen whether and when the United States Supreme Court
will further resolve the nature of the right to bear arms, specifically the
extent to which state laws restricting the carrying of firearms are consistent
with the right. However, state laws are judged in the first instance by state
constitutions. While the Virginia Supreme Court has said little about the
state arms guarantee, that may be in part because Virginia statutes have not
been unduly restrictive. Where a constitutional right is respected by the
legislature, it would seem to be a virtue that few judicial decisions are
necessary.
The historical understanding of the Second Amendment as guaranteeing
just what the text specifies-that "the right of the people to keep and bear
arms, shall not be infringed"-was called into question by the mid-20th
century "collective rights" view. The original understanding that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated Second Amendment rights and
protected them from state infringement also came to be rejected. The
Fourth Circuit accepted both of these views in the pre-Heller/McDonald
period. Specifically, it held that the Second Amendment did not protect
individual possession of a firearm and that a state (Maryland) could deny a
permit to carry a handgun because the Amendment does not apply to the
states.
The Supreme Court in McDonald noted "our central holding in Heller:
that the Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear
152
arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home."
150. Id. at 939 (citation omitted).
151. Overturning lower state court decisions, including one rejecting Moore, the Illinois
Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit decision. People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321 (Ill.
2013).
152. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044 (2010).
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However, the decisions rendered by the Fourth Circuit since those
opinions have reached the same results as its pre-Heller/McDonald
precedents. The Second Amendment fails to protect possession of a firearm
outside the home not because it only guarantees a "collective right," but
because no right to bear arms outside the home exists. Further, a state
(Maryland) may deny permission to carry a handgun outside the home not
because the Amendment fails to apply to the states, but because the state
may decide that an applicant does not have a "good and substantial reason"
for doing so. Do these decisions stem from lack of clarity in the Supreme
Court decisions, or are they push-back against those decisions? That will
ultimately be for the Supreme Court to decide.

